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Abstract
We incorporate home production in a dynamic general equilibrium model of
consumption and saving with illiquid housing and a collateralized borrowing con-
straint. We show that the model is capable of explaining life-cycle patterns of
households￿time use and consumption of di⁄erent categories. Speci￿cally, house-
holds￿market hours and home hours are fairly stable early in the life cycle. Market
hours start to decline sharply at age 50, while home hours begin to increase at
age 55. Households￿consumption of the market good, home input, and housing
services all exhibit hump shapes over the life cycle, with the market good having
the most pronounced hump, followed by the home input, and then housing ser-
vices. A plausibly parameterized version of our model predicts that the interaction
of the labor e¢ ciency pro￿le and the availability of home production technology
explain households￿time use over the life cycle. The resulting income pro￿les, the
endogenous borrowing constraint and the presence of home production account
for the initial hump in all three consumption goods. The consumption pro￿les in
the second half of the life cycle are mostly driven by the complementarity of home
hours, home input, and housing in home production.
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11 Introduction
This paper jointly examines the pro￿le of di⁄erent types of consumption goods over the
life-cycle and the time-use pro￿le of households over the lifecycle. It, thus, represents a
departure from the recent life-cycle literature that concentrates primarily on the pro￿le of
aggregate consumption. The primary motivation for doing so is generated by the recent
empirical work of Aguiar and Hurst (2009). Their work documents a signi￿cant amount
of heterogeneity in the life-cycle pro￿le of the components of consumption, and that the
di⁄erential behavior in various components of consumption is systematically linked to
whether some portion of the good could be produced at home or whether the good could
only be consumed directly from the market. This led the authors to postulate that the
di⁄erential behavior of consumption across goods over the life cycle was associated with
di⁄erent degrees of nonseparability between consumption and work. Importantly, we
￿nd that the pro￿le of hours used in di⁄erent activities over the life cycle is consistent
with the behavior of consumption. That association led us to construct a quantitative
life-cycle general equilibrium model with home production, because it provides a natural
theoretical setting for exploring the link between time use and consumption over various
types of goods. Another motivation for looking at heterogeneity is that its presence
implies important distinctions in an individual￿ s response to various economic policies
such as changes in taxes and Social Security. These policies will not only have aggregate
repercussions, but they could also di⁄erentially impact the demand for various goods
depending on the degree of substitutability between home production and market work
for each particular good. It, therefore, is important to account for both the aggregate
and speci￿c-goods behavior of households over their life cycle.
In modeling the process of home production, we include housing as an input into
home production. Doing so was desirable for a number of reasons. First, much of time
use is spent performing activities associated with owning a home and we are interested
in the joint relationship between how time is spent over the life cycle and how time-use
decisions are related to consumption decisions. Second, as Fernandez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2010) point out, certain ￿nancial constraints associated with durable good
purchases can help account for life-cycle consumption pro￿les and housing serves as the
durable good in our model. However, housing also possesses some features not usually
associated with other durables, namely, the cost of altering the amount of housing as
well as its slower depreciation, that turn out to be important in explaining consumption
behavior later in life. It is also straightforward to discipline the model with respect to
housing services as there exist accurate and detailed data regarding the housing decision.
Thus, an accurate depiction of housing decisions is shown to improve the model￿ s ability
2to ￿t both hours and consumption choices over the life cycle.
The modeling strategy we use depicts the household as a joint consumption-production
unit. Thus, we incorporate home production in a standard life-cycle model that includes
precautionary savings motives and endogenous labor supply decisions. Home production
uses housing, certain types of market-produced goods that serve as intermediate inputs,
and home hours to produce ￿nal home goods. The home goods, in turn, are substi-
tutable with market goods that can be directly purchased and consumed. The richness
of our framework enables us to broadly match the life-cycle behavior of consumption
of both market- and home-produced goods, the time allocation decisions of households,
and the amount of housing services consumed at various points in the life cycle.
In particular we are able to match four important aspects of life-cycle behavior.
The ￿rst, and perhaps least remarkable aspect, is the well-established ￿nding that total
household consumption, durable as well as nondurable, exhibits a strong hump shape
over the life cycle even after adjusting for economic growth and household size. The
second is the substantial heterogeneity across life-cycle pro￿les of individual consumption
expenditures. Using recent releases of the Consumption Expenditure Survey, we con￿rm
the general ￿ndings in Aguiar and Hurst (2009). However, instead of analyzing the many
di⁄erent types of consumption goods individually as Aguiar and Hurst (2009) do, we
group consumption goods into three broad categories according to their relationship
with home production. The ￿rst is housing, rented or owned, which is an important
component in home production. The second is the home input, consisting of goods
purchased from the market but that serve as intermediate inputs for home production,
such as food at home, housing appliances, household operations and utilities, etc. The
rest of the goods belong to the third category, labeled the market good. We ￿nd that the
market good exhibits the strongest hump shape over the life cycle, rising sharply early
in life and declining substantially late in life. The other two categories, by contrast, do
not rise or decline nearly as much. Third, our model produces choices over housing that
are consistent with what has been termed the ￿housing puzzle.￿Old age homeowners￿
house values do not decline much, if at all, toward the end of their life cycle, and this
puzzle pertains to renters as well.1 Standard models imply that the housing stock should
be consumed aggressively late in life. And fourth, the model matches the observation
that households labor supply also exhibits strong life-cycle patterns, with market hours
and home hours being fairly stable early in the life cycle. At age 50, market hours start
to decline sharply and home hours begin to increase after age 55.
1This latter observation poses challenges to the traditional theory of bequests as well adjustment
costs of older homeowners￿housing consumption behavior. For more discussion on the housing puzzle,
see Venti and Wise (2002) and Davido⁄ (2006).
3Our model has three key features that help account for these four observations. First,
households are subject to collateralized borrowing constraints; they can borrow only up
to a fraction of their house value. This feature, together with the standard assumption
regarding the labor e¢ ciency pro￿le and the presence of uninsurable labor income risk,
helps to account for the increasing consumption pro￿les in the early part of a household￿ s
life cycle as in Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010). Second, at each point in time,
households divide their time between market hours, hours in home production, and
leisure. As households age, their market labor e¢ ciency declines and they devote more
and more of their time to home production. As a result, consumption of the market
good declines drastically. Consumption of the home input and housing services also
declines, but the decline is much more muted due to their complementarity with home
hours in home production. Interestingly, home production also has a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on households￿consumption early in life. Households ￿nd it optimal to produce home
consumption and use it to help smooth overall consumption early in life. As a result,
households adjust their consumption of the market good relatively earlier in life. In
other words, their market consumption rises more steeply early in life and is overall
more humped in the presence of home production. Third, we di⁄erentiate between
owner-occupied housing and rental housing. We assume that housing adjustment is
costly for homeowners, but costless for renters. This assumption allows us to directly
measure the predictions of our model concerning owners￿and renters￿consumption and
labor supply against those from the data. Housing adjustment costs further contribute
to the slow decline in the homeownership rate and the value of the housing stock owned
as households age. Moreover, accounting for this aspect of behavior is likely to be crucial
for understanding the e⁄ects of di⁄erent collateral requirements on mortgages as well as
the e⁄ect of Social Security on household behavior.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our empirical
analysis in which we construct households￿life-cycle pro￿les of time use and consump-
tion. In section 3, we present the model. We discuss our calibration strategy in section
4 and results in section 5. Further, investigation of the model￿ s di⁄erent channels in
driving households￿behavior is presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The paper draws on two strands of the literature: the consumption literature and the
home production literature. One of the most prominent observations in the consump-
2See Chen (2009) for an exploration of the e⁄ects of changes in Social Security when households
have a renting-owning choice, but where labor supply is exogenous.
4tion literature is that aggregate consumption is hump-shaped over the life cycle. Market
incompleteness in the form of a borrowing constraint along with uncertain income leads
to precautionary savings, which is the key mechanism of leading theories that account
for this observation (Hubbard et al. 1994, Carroll 1997, and Gourinchas and Parker
2002).3 Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010) add to this literature by documenting
that the hump persists for consumption of both durables and nondurables when con-
sidered separately and they propose an incomplete markets model in which durables
serve as collateral to explain these stylized facts. Separately, Bullard and Feigenbaum
(2007) incorporate leisure into the utility function and show that this additional feature
helps explain the hump in the consumption. Huggett and Ventura (1999), Heathcote
(2002), and French (2005) combine precautionary saving, leisure and consumption in
their model to study retirement issues. Our paper shares many features with these pa-
pers, including the precautionary savings motive, liquidity constraint, and endogenous
labor leisure decision. The durable good in our model takes the explicit form of owner-
occupied residential housing. Our biggest innovation lies in the fact that we examine
the heterogeneity of consumption pro￿les along the lines of Aguiar and Hurst (2009) as
discussed in the introduction and that we are jointly interested in the interaction of time
use and consumption.
Our paper is also closely related to the recent home production literature. This
literature has shown that the introduction of home production in otherwise standard
dynamic general equilibrium models is useful in understanding a variety of macroeco-
nomic issues, including domestic and international business cycles, ￿scal policies, and
asset equilibrium puzzles (Baxter and Jermann 1997, Benhabib, et al. 1991, Bils, et
al. 2009, Campbell and Ludvigson 2001, Canova and Ubide 1998, Gomme, et al. 2001,
Greenwood and Hercowitz 1991, Greenwood, et al. 1995, and McGratten, et al. 1997).
A key way in which models with home production di⁄er from standard dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium models (that do not include home production) is that home production
allows households to substitute along additional margins, both in labor supply and in
total consumption. While many recent studies have used time-use data in order to un-
derstand household production (Aguiar and Hurst 2007 and Ramey 2008), much less
attention has been paid to the other factors involved in the production of home goods
(see Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright 2000 and papers cited therein).4 Our paper ￿lls in
3There is also a literature suggesting that time-inconsistent or myopic preferences over consumption
can play a role. See Laibson (1997). Several authors including Attanasio et al. (1999) and Brown-
ing and Ejrnaes (2002) argue that variation in household size could account for why preferences over
consumption by a household might change over the life cycle￿ that is, consumption is highest when
households are largest.
4One exception is Heathcote (2002), who studies the e⁄ect of home production on retirement.
5this gap by tying households￿labor supply (including leisure choice) and consumption
more closely together and we show that home production a⁄ects households￿lifecycle
consumption of all three goods, both later and early in life.
3 Empirical Observations on Lifecycle Behavior
In this section, we present our empirical ￿ndings on time use and consumption over the
life cycle. We ￿rst study time-use pro￿les using data from the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS), then we study consumption pro￿les of market goods, home input, and housing
services using data from the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX). We separate
households into owners and renters and deal explicitly with problems of household size,
cohort e⁄ect, and survey e⁄ect using the synthetic cohort strategy widely used in the
literature.5 It is worth noting that some of our empirical results have already been
documented in the literature. Our contribution lies in merging and reclassifying the two
data sets according to the macro literature on home production. Our di⁄erentiation
between homeowners and renters is also novel and important in explaining older age
households￿￿housing puzzle.￿
3.1 Life-Cycle Pro￿les of Time Use
The ATUS, carried out by the Bureau of Census under contract with the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, measures the amount of time people spend performing various activities, such
as work, child care, housework, watching television, volunteering, and socializing (see
Table 1). The data are strictly cross-sectional as respondents are interviewed only once.
Households are top coded at age 80.6 The survey started in 2003, with the most recent
one ending in 2007.
We include in our sample the 2005 to 2007 ATUS, since the ATUS started reporting
households￿house tenure in 2005. We focus on households whose head is between the
ages of 25 and 80 (inclusive) but exclude those whose head is either in school or in the
military at the time of the survey. Our ￿nal sample consists of 30,720 households, about
evenly split across the three survey years. We include both male and female respondents
in our sample.
We follow the tradition of Reid (1934) and separate nonmarket time into pure leisure
and home hours where home hours comprise time spent on activities performed at home
5We follow most closely the linear regression strategy in Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Aguiar
and Hurst (2009).
6All households between ages 80 and 84 are assigned age 80 and those that are 85 and above are
assigned age 85.
6to produce goods and services that can also be purchased in the market and are, for
the most part, not enjoyable to produce.7 According to Robinson and Godbey (1999,
Table 0), in a 1985 enjoyment of activities survey, households ranked having sex, playing
sports, ￿shing, enjoying art and music, and going to bars and lounges at the top and
doing yardwork, cleaning house/dishes, doing laundry, providing child health care, and
going to the car repair shop at the bottom. Indeed, empirical studies of home production
or homemaking, as in the earlier literature, typically classify food preparation, cleaning
the house, care of family members living in the household, and shopping and managing
the household as home production. Some also include gardening, care of others who
are not in the household, and entertaining children.8 We thus de￿ne home hours as
time spent doing house work, house work service, shopping, pet care, car care, child
care, adult care, shop search, car service, child care service and professional service. We
de￿ne market hours as the time the head of the household spends working, job searching
and commuting. We treat the remaining time as leisure. That is, as discussed in Bax-
ter and Rotz (2009), home production activities are associated with disutility, whereas
leisure activities provide utility. This decomposition strategy allows us to highlight the
substitution of home-produced goods and market goods.
For those households that were interviewed on Saturday or Sunday (holidays are
viewed the same as Sunday in the ATUS), we approximate their weekday hours by
the average hours of those interviewed on weekdays, in the same year, of the same
education, and gender. Similarly, we approximate the weekend and holiday hours for
households interviewed during weekdays. We adjust all hours by family size and survey
year e⁄ects. We also control for families that have young children (under the age of 6).
Following Aguiar and Hurst (2009), we identify life cycle from cohort e⁄ects by using
the multiple cross-sections in our model and use cross-sectional di⁄erences in family
size and interview year, respectively, to identify family size and interview year e⁄ects.



















it represents time use in category k (market work or home work), AGEit is a
vector of 55 one-year age dummies , Yit is a vector of three one-year interview dummies
(2006 is the omitted year), and Fit is a vector of family structure dummies that include
7In particular, she de￿nes home production as ￿those unpaid activities which are carried on, by and
for the members, which activities might be replaced by market goods, or paid services, if circumstances
such as income, market conditions, and personal inclinations permit the service being delegated to
someone outside the household group￿(Reid 1934, p.11).
8See Ramey (2008) for a thorough discussion.
79 family size dummies, 1 to 10, (household of size 2 is the omitted group; 10 includes
families with 10 or more family members). Y Cit is a dummy indicating whether the
family has any children under the age of 6. Mit is a dummy for marital status. The
coe¢ cients on the constant ￿k
0 together with age dummies, ￿k
age, capture the impact of
the life cycle conditional on family size and interview e⁄ects.
Figure 1 charts the share of market hours and home hours by age for the household
head. As can be seen, market hours by homeowners and renters track each other pretty
closely, with homeowners supplying slightly more market hours earlier in the life cycle
and slightly more home hours later in the life cycle than renters. In particular, both
homeowners and renters spend roughly 22 percent of their time working until age 50, then
they start reducing their market work sharply. By age 70, households spend less than
5 percent of their time working. Home hours hold steady until age 55 for homeowners
and renters. Then, they begin to increase and noticeably more so for homeowners.
3.2 Life-Cycle Pro￿les of Consumption Expenditure
The CEX, also carried out by the Bureau of Census under contract with the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, collects household demographic characteristics and consumption
information. The data are a rotating panel with each household being interviewed
from 2 to 5 quarters, and every quarter 25 percent of the sample is replaced by new
households. The short-panel dimension of CEX makes the direct use of panel techniques
nearly infeasible. We, thus, pool the data and treat it as one cross-section.
We include in our consumption sample the 2003 to 2006 CEX data. We include in
our market good food away from home, alcohol, tobacco, apparel, other lodging, fees
and admissions for entertainment, and related equipment such as televisions, radios,
sound systems, pets, toys, and playground equipment, reading, and personal care. We
also include education expenses and out-of-pocket medical expenses in the market good,
but our results are robust to the exclusion of these categories. We include in our home
input food at home, household operations, household furnishing and equipment, utilities,
fuels, and public services. We prorate transportation expenses by travel time for home
production or market production and leisure that we obtained from the ATUS discussed
in the previous subsection. For housing expenditures, we use rental payments for renters,
and we use homeowners reported house value of owned residence because we believe
homeowners typically have a better idea of how much their house is worth than how
much their house can be rented for. Using reported rental value for homeowners does
not change our results qualitatively.
We delete from our sample households that reported zero or negative consumption
8of the market good plus the home input, renters who reported less than $300 in annual
rent, and homeowners who reported less than $1000 in house value. All consumption
data are adjusted by their respective 2000 chained consumer price Index. Our ￿nal
sample consists of 48;048 households of which about 68 percent are homeowners.
We use the same strategy outlined in the previous subsection to identify life-cycle
pro￿les of the three consumption categories with the exception that we take the log of
our consumption data. The results are presented in Figure 2 in log deviations from age
25. As one can see, for homeowners, the market good, home input, and housing services
all move up substantially from age 25 to age 50. The hump in housing services, however,
is the most pronounced. The increase is over 40 percent as opposed to about 30 percent
in market and home goods. Starting in a household￿ s mid 50s, both consumption of
the market good and the purchases of home inputs begin to decline with market goods
experiencing a more signi￿cant drop. Housing services, by comparison, decline very
slightly starting in age 60. For renters, the market good starts declining from age 25 and
expenditures on home inputs is relatively ￿ at till age 40 at which time it starts to decline.
Rental housing services is mostly ￿ at, and this is at least in part due to selection e⁄ects.
Those households who remain renters are generally ones that have poor productivity
draws.
4 Model
We consider a model that is a modi￿cation of Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010),
Gervais (2002), Heathcote (2002), and Yang (2009), among others. In particular, it is
a discrete-time overlapping generations economy with an in￿nitely lived government.
The government taxes labor income and provides pensions to retirees. The model has
several key features. First, consumers value leisure and a composite consumption good
that consists of a market good and a home-produced good. We model home production
technology along the lines of Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991), Greenwood and
Hercowitz (1991), and Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright (2000). Second, households face
uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to their labor e¢ ciency. Finally, we restrict intertem-
poral trade by borrowing constraints collateralized by housing.
94.1 Technology








where K is the aggregate market capital stock and Nm is the aggregate market labor
input. The ￿nal good can be directly consumed, invested in physical capital, or used
as an intermediate input in home production.9 Physical capital, housing input, and
housing depreciate at rates ￿k, ￿d and ￿h, respectively.
Home production requires an intermediate home input, housing, and labor. In par-

















where d denotes the intermediate home input, h denotes the housing stock owned by
homeowners, s denotes the rental stock of renters, and nh the labor input in home pro-
duction. The parameter ￿ captures the discount of rental housing in home production,
implying that owner-occupied housing is more productive than rental housing in home
production, thus helping to generate a preference for owning relative to renting.11 The
parameters !1 and !2 control the weights associated with housing, and composite home
capital in home production, ￿1 governs the intra-class substitutability between home
input and housing, and ￿2 governs the inter-class elasticity of substitution between the
composite home input and home hours in home production.12 Note that a household
can either be a homeowner or a renter, but not both. Therefore, h and s cannot simul-
taneously take positive values.
9For simplicity, we have combined both nondurable expenditures such as raw food with consumer
durables such as appliances into a composite durable good used in home production. We term this
composite good home input. An interesting extension would be to treat these separately, especially for
modelling the cyclicality of consumption.
10Note that we use a lower case letter to respresent the home production technology as home pro-
duction takes place at the household level.
11Models of the type we are using generally need some feature to help generate a relative preference
for owning. Other possibilities include using tax bene￿ts of owning as in Gervais (2002) or assuming
higher depreciation of rental properties as in Chen (2010).
12Following Sato (1967), we justify our aggregation by the fact that intra-class elasticity (between
home input and housing) is potentially higher than the inter-class elasticity (between home input and
home hours or housing and home hours) since home input and housing are more similar in techno-
economic characteristics.
104.2 Financial Institutions
Following Gervais (2002), we assume there exists a two-period-lived ￿nancial institution
that pools households capital to supply mortgages and purchase rental housing. It
purchases ￿nal goods and uses them as housing services, which it then rents out to
renters for use in home production. Speci￿cally, at the end of the ￿rst period, the
intermediary accepts deposits and buys residential capital. In the second period, it
repays deposits with interest at rate r. Residential capital is rented to agents at a
price ￿ per unit. At the end of the second period, the ￿nancial institution sells the
undepreciated residential stock to a new agency. The no-arbitrage condition implies
that the rental rate on housing is given by
(3) ￿ = r + ￿
h:
4.3 Demographics
During each model period, a continuum of consumers is born. They immediately begin
working and consuming. Each consumer retires at t = Tr and dies by the end of age
T. Each consumer faces a positive probability of survival, given by ￿t; where 0 ￿
￿t ￿ 1. The probability of survival is exogenous and independent of other household
characteristics. Since the demographic patterns are stable, agents at age t make up a
constant fraction of the population at any point in time. Annuity markets are assumed
to be absent and accidental bequests are distributed to all households in the economy.
4.4 Consumer￿ s Maximization Problem
4.4.1 Preferences
Individuals derive utility from consumption of a composite good c that consists of a
market-produced nondurable good, cm; and a home-produced good, ch; and leisure, l.
Preferences are assumed to be time separable, with a constant discount factor ￿. The














(5) c = [!3c
1￿ 1
￿3







11!4 represents the relative weight of the composite consumption good in utility, ￿4 repre-
sents the degree of substitution between the composite consumption good and leisure, ￿
denotes the relative risk aversion parameter, !3 denotes the relative weight of the market
good in the composite consumption good, and ￿3 measures the degree of substitution
between the market good and the home-produced good.
4.4.2 Labor Productivity
Labor productivity consists of two components. The ￿rst is deterministic and age depen-
dent with all consumers of the same birth cohort facing the same exogenous pro￿le, et.
The second is stochastic with each worker, i; receiving a stochastic productivity shock
"i
t, which follows a Markov process
(6) ln"
i









The Markov process is the same for all households and there is no uncertainty over the
aggregate labor endowment. The total productivity of a worker at age t is then given by
the product of the worker￿ s age-t productivity shock and age-t deterministic e¢ ciency
index: et"i
t. After age Tr, households begin to receive Social Security income. We assume
that the Social Security bene￿ts are functions only of households￿age.
4.4.3 Transactions Costs and Housing
Housing markets are characterized by large transactions costs that involve both a con-
siderable amount of time and resources. Some of these costs include the opportunity
costs of time associated with search, brokerage and agent fees, recording fees, legal fees,
and origination fees. Moreover, households have to physically move to a new house,
which entails moving costs and psychological costs of changing neighborhoods (Smith,
Rosen and Fallis 1988).




0; if h0 2 [(1 ￿ ￿1)h; (1 + ￿2)h];
￿1h + ￿2h0; otherwise,
where h0 denotes the next period￿ s housing stock. This formulation of costs allows
households to change their level of housing consumption without moving by undertak-
ing housing renovation up to a fraction ￿2 of the value of the house or by allowing
depreciation up to a fraction ￿1 of the value of the house. If the house depreciates by
more than a fraction ￿1 of the value, or appreciates by more than a fraction ￿2 of the
12value, we assume that the house has been sold. In that case, the household must pay
costs that are a fraction ￿1 of its selling value. Buying a property incurs a fraction ￿2





Collateralized credit is the only form of credit in the economy. Further, the borrowing
rate, mortgage rate, and deposit interest rate are all assumed to be equal. This implies
that mortgages and deposits are perfect substitutes. To buy a house, a household must
satisfy a minimum down payment requirement equal to a fraction ￿ of the value of the
house. We use a0 to denote the net asset position. Therefore, at any given period the
household￿ s ￿nancial assets must satisfy13
(9) a
0 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)h
0:
In addition, to rule out negative bequests, net worth is bounded below by 0 according
to
(10) (1 + r)a
0 + (1 ￿ ￿
h)h




In a model where households di⁄er only by age, income, and wealth, rich households
tend to be homeowners and poor ones tend to be renters. In the US, a fraction of rich
households are renters.14 The existence of high-income renters may be due to hetero-
geneity in house prices, job mobility, preferences, or family composition. To capture
factors other than age, income, and wealth that a⁄ect households￿renting/owning de-
cision, we assume households face renting shocks. A household that receives a renting
shock is not allowed to own and can only rent. Let qt denote the probability of receiving
a renting shock at age t. The shock is exogenous and independent of other household
characteristics.
13For a household without a house, the borrowing constraint reduces to the standard form a0 ￿ 0:
14As reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2000, 12 percent of households whose income is in
the top quintile are renters, and 25 percent of those whose income is in the fourth quintile are renters.
134.4.6 Timeline
Before we describe the households￿optimization problem, we present the timeline for
their decisions (Figure 3). At the beginning of each period, after they observe their
current idiosyncratic labor shocks, the next period￿ s rental shock, and receive a bequest
households make their labor supply decisions and rent capital to ￿rms, and they also
purchase home input and rental housing for the current period. At this point, market
production takes place. Home production also takes place using labor, the home in-
put, and housing. After production, households receive factor payments and make their
consumption and asset allocation decisions. At the end of the period, market capital,
housing and home input depreciate and uncertainty about early death is revealed. Ac-
cidental bequests from those who die early are distributed to new agents next period to
￿rst satisfy an exogenous beginning of period asset position, and if funds are leftover,
they are distributed to the other agents in the economy. Households also make rental
versus owning decisions if they did not receive a rental shock, and in the event of owning,
they choose their house size at the end of the period.
4.4.7 The Household￿ s Recursive Problem
In a stationary equilibrium, the interest rate is constant at r as is the wage rate w per
e¢ ciency unit of labor. The household￿ s state variables are given by (m;t;a;h;d;");
which denote the agent￿ s rental shock for the next period (m), current age (t), ￿nancial
assets (a), undepreciated housing stock (h); home input from the previous period (d),
and labor productivity of the current period ("). If m = 1, then this household is not
allowed to own a house in the next period. If h = 0, then the household is a renter for
this period. We have
V (m;t;a;h;d;") = max
fcm;d0;s;a0;nm;nh;h0g
n











0) + ￿s1(h = 0) + h
01(m = 0) ￿ b + (1 + r)a + (1 ￿ ￿
h)h+ (11)
(1 ￿ ￿
d)d + (1 ￿ ￿)[et"wnm] + pen(t);
cm ￿ 0; s ￿ 0; a
0 ￿ 0;d
0 ￿ 0;0 ￿ nm;nh ￿ 1; (12)
where 1(:) is an index function that takes a value of 1 if the statement inside the parenthe-
sis is true and 0 otherwise, ￿ denotes the Social Security income tax before retirement,
14w denotes the wage, and pen(t) is the pension after retirement for t ￿ T r. In any
sub-period, an agent￿ s resources depend on asset holdings, a, labor endowment, et", or
pension, pen(t); housing stock, h, home input, d, and received bequests, b. Note that
agents receive a pension only after retirement. The composite consumption good c is
de￿ned as in equation (5), the home-produced good is de￿ned as in equation (2) using
current period housing h or s, home input d0; and home hours nh as inputs.
A formal de￿nition of a stationary equilibrium that includes market clearing condi-
tions is provided in Appendix A. The model is solved numerically. Appendix B describes
the computation algorithm in greater detail.
5 Calibration and Estimation
5.1 Parameter Calibration
We choose the parameters of our model in two steps. The ￿rst step is a standard
calibration exercise where we pick parameters individually that are based on economic
statistics from the data as well as choosing parameters, such as relative risk aversion,
that are consistent with the literature. The second step is more of an estimation in
which we jointly choose a set of 12 parameters that minimize a loss function based on
the di⁄erence between certain model and data moments calculated o⁄ households￿time
use and consumption. The calibrated parameters and the statistics that generate them
are given in Table 3 and the estimated parameters are given in Table 4. Table 5 indicates
how close the model moments match the data moments. We show that the model does
a good job of matching our target moments.
The model period is two years.15 At age 25, each person enters into the model.
The retirement age Tr is 61, and the maximum life length T is 100. Figure 4, panel
b, shows the ￿ts, the vector of 2-year conditional survival probabilities. We use the
mortality probabilities for people born in 1960, weighted by gender from the Social
Security Administration life tables.
The parameter ￿ is the share of income that goes to the nonresidential stock of
capital and is set at 0:240. This capital share is lower than in many real business cycle
calibrations because housing is not part of our model￿ s capital stock. We set ￿k to 0:10
and ￿h to 0:02. The rate, r; is the interest rate on capital net of depreciation and is set
to 0:04. Appendix C explains the rationale behind these choices in greater detail. We
assume that the intermediate home input depreciates completely in two years given that
15Given the model period, we adjust parameters in the model accordingly. We report parameters at
annual frequency, unless stated otherwise.
15household appliance and equipment accounts for less than 0:10 of total home input.
The deterministic age pro￿le of the unconditional mean of labor productivity, et;
taken from French (2005), is shown in the top panel of Figure 4. The labor-e¢ ciency
pro￿le is hump-shaped, with a peak at age 50. The persistence ￿y and variance ￿2
y of
the stochastic productivity process are 0:977 and 0:014, respectively (French 2005). The
variance of the initial distribution of productivity is 0.38 (Huggett 1996). For simplicity,
we assume the labor e¢ ciency pro￿le for home production to be constant.
We calibrate the Social Security tax ￿ to 0:096 to match the average payroll tax.16
We let pension pen(t) depend on the age of the household. In particular, a household
after age 65 receives the full pension payment. If he is at age 63-64, he receives 80
percent of the full pension, and if he is at age 61-62, he receives 40 percent of the full
pension.
The down payment rate ￿ is set to be 0:20, which is commonly used in the housing
literature. The probability of receiving a renting shock is from Li and Yao (2007), who
calibrated to average households migration rates for nonhousing-related reasons; these
are shown in the bottom panel of Figure 4. Gruber and Martin (2003) estimate the
reallocation cost from the CEX and ￿nd that the median household spends 7 percent
of a house￿ s value to sell it and 2.5 percent to purchase it. In our simulation, we
therefore choose transactions costs from sales to be ￿1 = 0:07 and from purchases to
be ￿2 = 0:025: Davido⁄ (2006) shows that homeowners over age 75, compared with
younger owners of similar homes, spend about 0.8 percent of home value less per year
on routine maintenance. We choose a big range and set ￿1 = ￿h; ￿2 = 4￿h. That is to
say, households can change their level of housing consumption by allowing depreciation
or renovation as alternatives to moving.
We take the risk aversion parameter, ￿, to be 1:5, from Attanasio et al. (1999),
and Gourinchas and Parker (2002), who estimate it from consumption data. The initial
distribution over state variables (wealth, house size and house tenure) for households of
age 25 is calculated using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (2001, 2004, and
2007) for households whose heads are between ages 23 and 26. Accidental bequests are
￿rst distributed to new agents to reproduce the distribution of capital endowments.17
The rest, if there are any, is distributed evenly to all agents alive, which endogenously
determines b.
16The Social Security payroll tax rate in the US is about 10 percent after we take out the part of the
bene￿ts due to Medicare and disability insurance.
17Since the model does not allow negative wealth, negative wealth holdings in the data are treated
as zero. Most households start with wealth endowments close to zero.
165.2 Estimation
Regarding the estimated moments, we choose the parameters, ￿; pen; ￿; h, ￿i, !i;
(i = 1;2;3;4) based on the following moments: K=Y; payroll taxes, the homeown-
ership rate, the average ￿nancial wealth of homeowners relative to renters, the aver-
age home input of both renters and homeowners (d); the average house size of renters
and homeowners (s;h); and the average market hours and home hours of both renters
and homeowners. We also normalize the average expenditure by economy-wide income.
Thus, we simultaneously choose these 12 parameters to match the 12 selected moments
as summarized in Table 4. The moments basically involve various expenditure and asset
to income ratios as well as moments pertaining to the use of time. It is important to note
that although our procedure jointly uses 12 moments to identify 12 parameters, certain
moments are relatively more responsible for pinning down the shares and elasticities in
the CES aggregates.
For example, the pension is picked so that the government remits all of the Social
Security tax revenue it collects, and ￿ is largely determined by K=Y: Also, ￿ and h
are determined by homeownership rates and the relative ￿nancial wealth of homeowners
and renters. Regarding the eight parameters in our CES aggregates, it is the relative
di⁄erences between homeowners and renters that allow us to identify these parameters.
As mentioned earlier, the four elasticity parameters (￿i, i = 1;2;3;4) play crucial
roles in determining households￿supply of labor to di⁄erent activities and consumption
of di⁄erent goods. These parameters, along with the share parameters (!i; i = 1;2;3;4)
are largely identi￿ed from the shares of house size (rental size) relative to income, the
expenditure on home input relative to income, the relative amount of time worked at
home and the relative amount of time worked in the marketplace. Because homeown-
ership is more expensive than renting, homeowners tend to have a higher ratio of d=h,
and the di⁄erence in this moment for the two types of agents allows us to pin down ￿1
and !1: Using the relative amount of time spent in home production across these two
types of agents helps to pin down ￿2 and !2: Similarly, the di⁄erence across renters and
homeowners regarding the relative time worked in the marketplace, because it in￿ uences
how much of the market good is purchased, helps to pin down ￿3 and !3: Finally, the
di⁄erence in d=y and h=y as well as the di⁄erential use of time, because they help de-
termine the di⁄erences in C=y and l; is useful for identifying ￿4 and !4. However, the
estimation is a bit more complicated than that and is not totally driven by one set of
moment di⁄erentials driving one pair of elasticity and share parameters. Substitutability
between various components in the CES aggregators a⁄ects how productive a home is
relative to renting, which in turn a⁄ects choices of homeownership and, therefore via a
selection e⁄ect, all the relative moments of homeowners and renters.
175.2.1 Implications
According to our calibration, the home input and housing are Hicksian substitutes in
the production of the composite home good. The composite home good and home hours
exhibit strong complementarity in home production.18 The market good and home good,
on the other hand, are substitutes. Finally, the ￿nal composite consumption good made
up of the market good and home good is substitutable with leisure in households￿utility.
The existing literature on home production has largely lumped home hours and leisure
together into nonmarket hours, making the comparison with our estimates di¢ cult. Nev-
ertheless there is some supporting evidence from the literature. For example, Abbott
and Ashenfelter (1976) ￿nd that housing, transportation, and other services tend to be
complementary with nonmarket time. Barnett (1979) estimates a model of joint goods
and leisure consumption and ￿nds non-weakly-separable substitution between consump-
tion and leisure. Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) argue that to generate comovement
in investments in durable goods in the market and at home one needs to have comple-
mentarity between durable goods and time in home production.19 The ￿nding that the
home input and housing are complements with home hours in home production explains
why after a household moves from being a two-earner family to a one-earner family,
home capital typically increases, as documented in Baxter and Rotz (2009). The strong
substitutability between market goods and home goods is consistent with the ￿ndings
in the literature, notably Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (1995). After we present house-
hold optimal decision rules and life-cycle pro￿les, we will conduct additional analysis to
further understand the identi￿cation of these parameters.
6 Numerical Results
This section compares the model-implied life-cycle patterns with those constructed in
the data as discussed in section 2. The pro￿les are calculated by integrating each variable
(consumption or hours used) over the invariant distribution at each age. We show that
the model does a good job of matching life-cycle pro￿les.
18The direct partial elasticities of substitution between home input and home hours and housing and
home hours can be derived using formulas provided in Sato (1976). Using the economy-wide average
consumption, we calculate that the elasticity of substitution between home input and home hours is
0.817 and the elasticity of substitution between housing and home hours is 0.869.
19Chang (2002) argues that adjustment costs in capital accumulation can account for the comovement
in investments.
186.1 Homeownership
Figure 5 compares the model￿ s prediction of the fraction of homeowners at each age with
the data. Our model prediction tracks the data pro￿le with reasonable accuracy￿ only
the very oldest (ages 79 and 80) fall outside of the two-standard-deviations error band.20
In the model, most young agents rent while accumulating ￿nancial assets. As time goes
by, more households have accumulated su¢ cient funds for down payments to become
homeowners. Homeownership rates continue to be very high late in life.
In our model, renting has several advantages over owning. First, since there is no min-
imum size in rental units, relatively poor households can rent relatively small units rather
than buy a large one. Second, renters can adjust housing without paying transaction
costs. On the other hand, owning might dominate renting, because owners can borrow
against a portion of house value when purchasing a house. This feature distinguishes
owner-occupied housing from other expenditures in the model. Also, owner-occupied
housing is more productive than rental properties in home production with an e¢ ciency
gap of 15 percent. For young agents, who face future income shocks and on average
receive lower income than middle-aged agents, renting is more attractive than owning.
Once agents have accumulated a down payment and most uncertainty in income has
been revealed, they choose to own. The gradual process of acquiring enough wealth to
purchase a home also has implications regarding the distribution of agents who continue
to rent over their life cycle. Apart from those that draw a rent shock, they tend to be
households that have drawn a low labor productivity pro￿le. Thus, over time there is a
selection e⁄ect regarding the productivity of agents who rent. Also, the desire to own a
house has implications for the life-cycle pro￿le of asset accumulation. As in Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger (2010) most young households￿initial wealth accumulation is in
the form of houses.
6.2 Life-Cycle Pro￿les of Hours
Figure 6 shows the life-cycle pro￿les of the average fraction of time spent in working and
home production in the model. Notice that our model does a good job of capturing the
life-cycle pro￿les of hours spent in market work, home production, and leisure for both
homeowners and renters. Young agents, all starting with little wealth, work relatively
intensively to buy goods, to accumulate precautionary assets, and to save for future
house purchases. As agents age, they spend more time at home and decrease market
hours. This is largely driven by the labor e¢ ciency pro￿le, which peaks at around age
50. The distribution of Social Security bene￿ts starting at age 61 provides additional
20The error bands of our empirical data pro￿les are obtained using bootstrap.
19incentive for households to reduce their labor supply after age 61. Note that the increase
of resources after age 61 from Social Security bene￿ts induces more reduction in market
hours for renters in the model. This occurs because in our model pension distribution
is a function only of age. Therefore, for old age renters whose labor productivity tends
to be low, pension payment may exceed their labor income substantially.
Homeowners spend more time in home production than renters in the same age
group. This stems from the fact that under our parameterization, time and houses are
complements. Homeowners on average have more housing capital than renters and thus
spend more time at home.
6.3 Life-Cycle Pro￿les of Consumption
The left panel of Figure 7 shows, in percentage deviation from the corresponding value
at age 25, the life-cycle pro￿les of average demand for market consumption, housing
and market inputs for homeowners. Again our model prediction falls within the two-
standard-deviations error band of the data estimation. Over the life cycle, average
consumption of market goods for homeowners is hump-shaped and peaks at age 55.
Market goods consumption at age 55 is about 30 percent more than that at age 25.
After the peak, market goods consumption decreases dramatically with age. Market
goods consumption at age 80 is about 50 percent less than that at age 25. Facing an
increasing future income pro￿le, young agents would like to borrow to ￿nance their
current consumption but they are borrowing constrained. This explains why early in
life consumption increases as income does. As households age, they start to decrease
the pro￿le of their overall consumption due to the fact that they are discounting fu-
ture consumption by more as they age and face a lower survival rate. Their market
consumption decreases by more as older households substitute home consumption for
market consumption.
The demand for housing in the model reproduces the empirically observed pro￿les,
increasing early in life and downsizing slowly later in life. Households begin their eco-
nomic lives with little housing stock. During the early part of their lives, because of
the existence of borrowing constraints and the role of housing as collateral, they forgo
nonhousing consumption and build housing stock quickly. Agents build up their highest
housing stock at age 60. The elderly decrease their housing stock quite slowly, due to
transactions costs and the increasing home hours, which are complements to home input
and housing in home production. Old households are less likely than young households
to move and incur the accompanying transactions costs, because they can only live in
the new house for a relatively short period of time.
20Home input and housing generally track each other over the life cycle as both are
complements with home hours in home production. However, the transactions costs in
housing adjustment for homeowners make the track less than perfect, which explains
why home input declines faster than housing. Using detailed ATUS, Baxter and Rotz
(2009) ￿nd that when a wife leaves the labor force, home hours rise as expected, but
durables also rise, which is unexpected, according to standard home production models.
This pattern, however, is entirely consistent with our model as home input is a comple-
ment with home hours with the direct partial elasticity of substitution at 0.817 (see our
discussion in footnote 17 in the calibration section).
The right panel of Figure 7 shows the life-cycle pro￿les of average market consump-
tion and demand for housing and home input for renters. For renters, the expenditures
on all three goods starts declining from age 30, and the expenditure on market goods
has the biggest decline. Note that the life-cycle pro￿les of renters are strongly a⁄ected
by selection e⁄ects. As renters age, more and more of them become homeowners. Those
who remain renters tend to be relatively poor with fewer resources and thus consume
less. Since rental housing is costless to adjust, utility optimization implies that the ratio
of housing to home input is constant for renters; thus, the pro￿le for home input coin-
cides with the one for housing. Average consumption of market goods for renters does
not vary much before age 65, but decreases very dramatically after retirement. Home
input and housing decline less dramatically since both are complements with home hours
in home production.
6.4 Life-Cycle Pro￿les of Wealth Composition
Figure 8 displays the evolution of the wealth portfolio over the life cycle for homeowners
and renters calculated from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) using the same
synthetic cohort method. Figure 9 displays the same pro￿les generated by our model
simulation. Our model matches the qualitative features of the wealth pro￿les of both
owners and renters, although the hump in owners￿￿nancial wealth is more pronounced
in the data than in the model.
Young households, which start with little wealth and expect to have much higher
earnings in the future, do not hold much wealth. Early in life, households borrow as
much as possible to buy houses and thus save in the form of housing. As time progresses,
agents have accumulated stocks of houses and start to increase their holding of ￿nancial
assets. The pro￿les of ￿nancial assets and housing assets intersect in the early 40s.
Financial wealth holding peaks at age 55. Afterwards, households start to use their
assets to ￿nance consumption. At very old ages, homeowners borrow against their
21homes and take on debt.
Renters hold fewer ￿nancial assets than homeowners. Compared with the data,
the ￿nancial assets pro￿les for both owners and renters have humps that are more
pronounced. Since we abstract from bequest motives, health expenditure uncertainty,
or other shocks, old agents in our model do not have bequest or precautionary saving
motives and run down their assets much more quickly than in the data.21
7 Inspecting the Model￿ s Mechanisms
In this section, we turn o⁄ various parts of the model to help understand the impor-
tant interrelationships that home production and housing decisions play in matching
the pro￿les of consumption and hours over the life cycle. First, we take away the home-
ownership decision by making everyone a renter. Then we take away housing by setting
!1 = 1; and then shut down home production by setting !1 = 1;!2 = 1; and !3 = 1:
Finally, we make labor e⁄ort exogenous by setting !3 = 1 and !4 = 1; leaving us with
an exogenous income process and the determination of aggregate consumption as in the
initial literature on life-cycle consumption. With each restriction on parameters we do
not reestimate the model, creating a presumption that the life-cycle pro￿les of the model
will deteriorate relative to the benchmark. What the experiment is intended to do is to
analyze exactly how the ￿t deteriorates, thus providing intuition regarding the linkage
between the various features of the benchmark model. The results of this exercise are
displayed in Tables 6 and 7 and Figure 10. The tables, which normalize the life-cycle
consumption pro￿les to the average income in the benchmark, show that the scaling of
the model economy is substantially altered by the various changes in parameter settings
while the ￿gures, which normalize the life-cycle consumption pro￿les to age 25 values,
indicate how the pro￿les change.
First, examine the e⁄ect of removing owner-occupied housing. There is a signi￿cant
e⁄ect in the life-cycle pro￿le of housing size. Without the need to put down a down
payment to buy a house, young households rent larger housing units, maintaining the
e⁄ective productivity of housing across the two scenarios. However, house size peaks
much earlier in the rental economy and peaks at a lower level. House size also declines
much more sharply later in life when all households rent, because there are no trans-
actions costs in downsizing houses.22 As a result, home production is somewhat less
21The risk of incurring substantial medical expenses such as out-of-pocket medical expenses and
uninsurable nursing home expenses might generate precautionary savings and a⁄ect the wealth pro￿le
(De Nardi, French and Jones (2010)). The e⁄ect of medical costs on the life-cycle consumption and
saving in an environment with housing is left for future research.
22Note that in the all-renters economy, housing pro￿les track exactly that of home input. We,
22productive in the renters-only economy and market consumption is somewhat higher as
are market hours (see Tables 6 and 7). Regarding the life-cycle pro￿le of home input,
it is less steep, peaks earlier, and declines faster. This behavior is a consequence of the
greater ￿ exibility in housing in the all-renter economy, since the pro￿le for home input
coincides with the one for housing. With respect to market consumption it is slightly
￿ atter early in life, re￿ ecting the removal of the down payment constraint with respect
to housing. Overall, however, the e⁄ect is not large. In terms of home hours, households
work less at home especially later in life when they are downsizing their apartments.
They also work a little more intensively in the market early in life, which is in part due
to substituting market hours for less productive home hours. All told, while there are
meaningful e⁄ects from removing owner-occupied housing, the e⁄ects are not dramatic.
Removing the need for housing implies that the home input is more productive in
home production as it no longer enters through a nested CES aggregator ￿and, therefore,
it is not subject to the same degree of diminishing returns. Households now purchase
more home input. However, because renting was cheaper than the home input, the total
amount of intermediate inputs in home production declines and households work less
intensively in home production. They also work a bit more in the market relative to the
benchmark. The change in hours use leads to market consumption replacing some of the
loss in home consumption. The pro￿le for the home input peaks much earlier in life than
the benchmark and at a lower relative level. Essentially, the pro￿le is the same as in the
all-renters economy because the home input and rental housing are purchased in constant
proportions. However, the pro￿le for market consumption is only slightly changed from
the benchmark and is almost identical to its pro￿le in the all-renters economy.
Without home production (!3 = 1), the changes in behavior are now dramatic.
Households respond by working a lot harder in the marketplace and the pro￿le for hours
declines more slowly later in life. This is driven by the labor e¢ ciency pro￿le and the
pension provision and the fact that households don￿ t have the option to spend more time
at home later in life, as they do in the benchmark. Because households earn more, the
liquidity constraint is not as binding and the pro￿le for market consumption is a good
deal ￿ atter. Further, households no longer can smooth total consumption using home
production and have a greater desire to smooth market consumption.
Finally, by setting !4 = 1, we replicate the Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) result
that when there is no labor-leisure decision the life-cycle pro￿le for market consumption
is smoother. The ￿ attening of the pro￿le is due to the lack of substitutability between
leisure and consumption. In particular, households work less both early and late in life
than they do in middle age. That feature tends to reduce consumption early and late in
therefore, don￿ t chart housing separately.
23life relative to middle age consumption when leisure enters utility.
8 Conclusions
We extend a standard life-cycle model of consumption by including housing decisions
that involve an important external margin concerning homeownership along with the
addition of an explicit home production environment. The model, thus, explicitly distin-
guishes between market and nonmarket-related labor supply and consumption variables.
We show that such a model can account for the observed life-cycle patterns in house-
holds￿time use as well as consumption of di⁄erent categories. In particular, the labor
e¢ ciency pro￿le together with the availability of households￿retirement funds implies
that households have incentives to drastically reduce their labor supply at around age
50. As they reduce their market hours, households allocate more of their time to home
production and leisure. On the consumption front, households initially increase their
consumption of market goods, home goods, and housing as they accumulate more assets
to relax their borrowing constraint. Toward retirement age, as households reduce their
market hours, the cost of home production is lower. Consequently, the consumption of
market goods declines because households substitute home-produced domestic goods for
market goods. Home goods and housing also decline slightly as households approach
the end of their life cycle, but the decline is partially o⁄set by the requirements of home
production. Thus, the additional margins associated with home production help the
model not only to match aggregate life-cycle consumption pro￿les but also to match the
pro￿les of di⁄erent categories of goods. Importantly, the model can account for how
households allocate time to various activities over the life cycle and this time use is
empirically consistent with their consumption decisions. Further, the explicit modeling
of the housing decision allows us to discriminate between renters and homeowners and
to show that our framework is capable of matching both types of household behavior.
24Appendix A. De￿nition of the Stationary Equilibrium
We focus on the stationary equilibrium of the economy where factor prices and agent
distribution over state space are constant over time. Each agent￿ s state is denoted by
x. Let S denote the aggregate housing stock available for renting, H the aggregate
owner-occupied housing stock, D the aggregate stock of home input, Cm the aggregate
consumption of the market good, Ih the aggregate investment on housing, Id the aggre-
gate investment on home input, Ik the aggregate investment on physical capital, T c the
total transactions costs for trading housing, Nm aggregate market hours supplied, and
Nh aggregate home hours supplied.
De￿nition 1. A stationary equilibrium is given by government policies including tax
rate ￿, and pension pen(t); an interest rate r and a wage rate w; value functions
V (x); allocations cm(x), a0(x), h0(x), d0(x), s(x), nm(x), nh(x); bequest b; and
a constant distribution of people over the state variables x, ￿(x), such that the
following conditions hold:
(i) Given the government policies, the interest rate, the wage, and the expected
bequest, the value functions and allocations solve the above described maximization
problem for a household with state variables x.
(ii) ￿(:)is the invariant distribution of households over the state variables.




































































0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
d)d]￿(dx);
Ik = K
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
k)K;
F
m(K;Nm) = Cm + Ik + Ih + Id + T
c:
Appendix B: Computation of the Model
Due to nonconvex transactions costs on housing and the collateralized borrowing
constraint, we cannot use either an Euler equation approximation or the policy function
iteration. Hence, we solve the model using value function approximation.
To compute the steady state of our model, we ￿rst discretize the income process into
5 points. The state space for owner-occupied housing and asset holdings are discretized
into unevenly spaced grids. The upper bounds on the grids are chosen to be large enough
so that they do not constitute a constraint on the optimization problem. We chose 20
grid points for each of the asset variables. The choice variables are searched over 100
grid points for housing and assets and continuous for other variables. We use linear
approximation to approximate valuation functions for the points not on the state grids.
We solve for the steady-state equilibrium as follows:
1. Make an initial guess of interest rate r; the wage rate w and pension.
2. Guess the size of accidental bequests.
3. Set the value function after the last period to be 0 and solve the value function
for the last period of life for each of the points of the grid. This yields policy functions
26and value functions in the last period.
4. By backward induction, repeat step 3 until the ￿rst period in life.
5. Compute the associated stationary distribution of households by forward induction
using the policy functions starting from the known distribution over types of age.
6. Check whether the associated accidental bequests are consistent with the initial
guess. If so, continue to step 7. If not, go back to step 2 and update accidental bequests.
7. Check whether market clearing conditions hold, and whether the government
budget is balanced. If so, an equilibrium is found. If not, go to step 1 and update the
initial guess.
Appendix C: Calibration
We use data from the National Income and Product Accounts and the Fixed Assets
Tables for the years 1957-2007. In order to properly calibrate a model with two assets
and without government taxes and expenditures, we make some imputations.
In measuring capital income share, we ￿rst remove income from the housing sector
and the government sector from the national income accounts. Then we de￿ne private
labor income, Ypl, as compensation of employees, unambiguous capital income (UCI) as
rental income, corporate pro￿ts and net interest, and ambiguous capital income (ACI)
as other income excluding employee compensation, UCI, and depreciation. Thus total
private nonhousing income Yp is the sum of Ypl, ACI, UCI, and depreciation. Private
capital income Ypk is de￿ned as UCI + depUCI + ￿ ￿ (ACI + depACI) = ￿ ￿ Yp: In other
words, we allocate the ambiguous components of capital income and its depreciation
according to the share of capital income in measured total output. The share of capital
is calibrated as
(13) ￿ = (UCI + depUCI)=(Yp ￿ ACI ￿ depACI):
We compute an average share of capital ￿ = 0:240.
The variable Ik is total private nonresidential investment, K is private ￿xed non-
residential assets. We calculate the average capital-output ratio K
Y = 1:61; and the
investment-capital ratio
Ik
K = 0:10: Given that the paper abstracts from population as
well as technology growth, we set the depreciation rate for nonhousing capital ￿k at 0:10.
The implied real interest rate is thus r = ￿ Y
K ￿ ￿k = 0:05. Note that this rate is some-
what higher than the 0:027and 0:040 range typically used in the literature. Given that
capital stock is measured with considerable error (Gomme and Rupert 2007), we decide
to follow the literature and set our equilibrium real rate of interest at 0:04: Holding the
nonhousing capital depreciation rate at 0:10, this implies a capital-output ratio of 1:71;
27slightly higher than the calculated 1:61. We set the depreciation rate on housing capital
￿h to 0:02, well within the range of those used in the literature.
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32Table 1. Market Hours versus Home Hours
Category De￿nition
Market hour Working (including work-related as well as income-generating other activities),
Job search, Job interview
Commuting
Home hour Housework (interior cleaning; laundry; sewing; repair and maintenaning textiles;
storing interior household items; food and drink preparation, presentation and
cleaning; interior arrangement, decoration and repairs; building and repairing
furniture; heating and cooling; interior maintenance; exterior cleaning; exterior
repair, improvement, and cleaning; lawn, garden, and houseplant care; ponds,
pools, and hot tubs; appliance and tool set-up, repair, and maintenance (by self);
￿nancial management; household and personal organization and planning;
household and personal mail and messages; home security; and related travel)
Housework service (using interior cleaning services; using meal preparation
services, using clothing repair and cleaning services; waiting associated with using
household services; using and waiting associated with home maint/repair/dØcor/
construction services; using and waiting associated with lawn and garden services;
telephone calls to/from household service providers; and all related travel)
Shopping (grocery, gas, food, and others, waiting associated with shopping, security
procedures related to consumer purchases; telephone calls to and from salesperson;
and all related travel)
Pet care (care for animals and pets, using and waiting for veterinary services, using
and waiting for pet services; and travel related to these services)
Car care (vehicle repair and maintenance and related services, including travel)
Child care (physical care for children; reading, playing and talking with children;
planning and attending children￿activities; doing homework, meeting and school
conferences; medical care and associated services to children)
Adult care (physical care and related services to adult; housework, animal care,
vehicle repair and maintenance; ￿nancial management; medical care and services;
and related travel)
Shop search (comparison shopping and research purchases)
Child care service (paid child care services and related travel)
Professional service (￿nancial; legal; health care; real estate related; related
telephone and travel)
33Table 2. Market Consumption versus Home Input
Category De￿nition





Fees and admissions for entertainment
Televisions, radios, sound and other entertainment-related equipment





Transportation expenses prorated by travel time for leisure- or market-related activities
Home input Food at home
Household operations
Household furnishing and equipment
Utilities, fuels, and public services
Transportation expenses prorated by travel time for home production
34Table 3. Calibration According to the Data and the Literature
Parameters Value Source
Demographics
T maximum life expectancy 100
Tr retirement age 61
￿t survival probability see ￿gure 4 Social Security Administration
Life Tables
Technology
￿ capital share in National Income Accts. 0:240 authors￿calculation
￿k annual depreciation rate of capital 0:100 authors￿calculation
￿h annual depreciation rate of housing 0:020 authors￿calculation
￿d biannual depreciation rate of home input 1:00 authors￿calculation
Endowment
et age-e¢ ciency pro￿le see ￿gure 4 French (2005)
￿y AR(1) coe¢ cient of 2-year income process 0:960 French (2005)
￿2
y innovation of 2-year income process 0:045 French (2005)
Government policy
￿ Social Security tax 0:096 payroll tax minus Medicare
and disability insurance
Housing market
￿ down payment rate 0:200
￿1 transactions costs of selling a house 0:070 Gruber and Martin (2003)
￿2 transactions costs of buying a house 0:025 Gruber and Martin (2003)
￿1 maximum depreciation 0:020
￿2 maximum renovation 0:080
mt rental shock see ￿gure 4 Li and Yao (2007)
Preference
￿ risk aversion coe¢ cient 1:500 Attanasio, et. al (1999),
Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
35Table 4. Calibration to Match Data Moments
Parameters (12) Value
￿ discount factor 0:954
pen Social Security bene￿t 0:266
￿ renting disutility 0:181
h minimum owner-occupied house size 1:072
￿1 sub. between d and h 1:369
!1 weight on durable 0:703
￿2 sub. betw. d and h composite and nh 0:802
!2 weight on d and h composition 0:748
￿3 sub. betw. market and home goods 2:063
!3 weight on market goods 0:138
￿4 sub. betw. consumption and leisure 1:408
!4 weight on consumption 0:243
Table 5. Calibration Results
Moments Model Data
capital output ratio (K/Y) 1:710 1:700
homeownership 0:680 0:685
Social Security tax rate 0:096 0:096
renter nonhousing wealth/owner nonhousing wealth 0:156 0:156
renters
average expenditure on home input goods/income 0:370 0:359
average housing value/income 1:872 1:926
average share of home hours 0:138 0:139
average share of market hours 0:151 0:156
owners
average expenditure on home input goods/income 0:661 0:675
average housing value/income 3:181 3:172
average share of home hours 0:155 0:155
average share of market hours 0:159 0:157
36Table 6. Inspecting the Model￿ s Mechanisms ￿Consumption/Economy-Wide Income
Age Benchmark All-renters No housing No home prod. No home prod. or leisure
Housing
26 2.0255 2.4468 0 0 0
36 2.4467 2.9116 0 0 0
46 2.8458 3.2385 0 0 0
56 3.0938 3.3926 0 0 0
66 3.1273 3.2370 0 0 0
76 2.8266 2.7606 0 0 0
86 2.2497 1.8685 0 0 0
Home input
26 0.2357 0.2347 0.3711 0 0
36 0.2807 0.2793 0.4414 0 0
46 0.3106 0.3107 0.4901 0 0
56 0.3248 0.3255 0.5151 0 0
66 0.3086 0.3106 0.4916 0 0
76 0.2615 0.2648 0.4181 0 0
86 0.1757 0.1793 0.2830 0 0
Market consumption
26 0.4975 0.5220 0.5441 2.2434 3.2491
36 0.7110 0.7067 0.7360 2.8522 4.0558
46 0.8327 0.8290 0.8608 3.2863 4.6246
56 0.8653 0.8660 0.9025 3.4481 4.9694
66 0.6911 0.6937 0.7249 3.1079 4.8617
76 0.4783 0.4866 0.5071 2.3360 4.2152
86 0.2237 0.2306 0.2422 1.3550 3.0634
37Table 7. Inspecting the Model￿ s Mechanisms ￿Share of Hours
Age Benchmark All-renters No housing No home prod. No home prod. or leisure
Market hours
26 0.2079 0.2192 0.2218 0.5775 1
36 0.2339 0.2357 0.2388 0.6018 1
46 0.2113 0.2112 0.2153 0.5830 1
56 0.1820 0.1845 0.1870 0.5494 1
66 0.0777 0.0797 0.0813 0.3959 1
76 0.0213 0.0236 0.0245 0.1932 1
86 0.0041 0.0048 0.0051 0.0737 1
Home hours
26 0.1355 0.1344 0.1255 0 0
36 0.1358 0.1354 0.1264 0 0
46 0.1422 0.1412 0.1317 0 0
56 0.1486 0.1464 0.1369 0 0
66 0.1654 0.1626 0.1521 0 0
76 0.1715 0.1679 0.1571 0 0
86 0.1662 0.1619 0.1514 0 0


























































Figure 1. Supply of Hours by Homeowners and Renters (data source: American Time
Use Survey 2005-2007. share of market hours: -*; share of home hours: -+)
































































Figure 2. Consumption by Homeowners and Renters (data source: Expenditure Survey
2003-2006; market consumpion: -*; home input: -+; housing: ￿ )
39Beginning of period ! labor shock for t, ! market and ! end of period t
t rental shock for t+1, home production whether survive
and bequest for t take place to t+1 revealed
realized, home input
from t-1 depreciates
state variable (age, supply labor and consume, save,
asset, house size if capital, purchase decide tenure
own, home input) home input for and house size
t home production, for t+1
housing depreciates
Figure 3. Households TimeLine of Decisions
















Figure 4. Exogenous pro￿les


































Homeownership Rate over the Life Cycle
Figure 5. Homeownership Rate over the Life Cycle (data source: CEX) (data ￿ ; model:
-*. The dotted lines are two standard deviations calculated o⁄ the data)


















































































Figure 6. Hours over the Life-cycle (data: ￿ ; model: -*; the dotted lines are two
standard deviations calculated o⁄ the data)


























































































Figure 7. Consumption over the Life-cycle (data: ￿ ; model: -*; the dotted lines are two
standard deviations calculated o⁄ the data)






























Figure 8. Wealth Pro￿les over the Life Cycle (SCF 2001, 2004, and 2007; owners￿
￿nancial wealth: -*; owners￿housing asset: -+; renters ￿nancial wealth: ￿ )


























Figure 9. Wealth Pro￿les over the Life Cycle (model; owners￿￿nancial wealth: -*;
owners￿housing asset: -+; renters ￿nancial wealth: ￿ )
















































c: b + omega1=1
d: c + omega3=1
e: d + omega4=1











































Figure 10. Investigating the Model￿ s Di⁄erent Mechanisms (benchmark: -*; all-renters:
-square; no housing: -circle; no home production: - -; no home production and no
leisure: ￿ ) (note: in the right bottom panel, market hours of the no home production
case uses the right vertical axis)
46